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Abstract 
Moral decisions in the marketplace largely depend on consumers’ own behavioral history. 
Psychology literature distinguishes two possible routes for consumers’ sequential moral decision 
making: moral balancing and moral consistency. Moral balancing refers to consumers’ deviation 
from the moral stance reflected in their past decisions; moral consistency implies that consumers 
repeat their prior moral and immoral decisions. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, four 
experimental studies affirm that balancing effects occur for consumers with a strong promotion 
focus, but consistency is more pronounced for prevention-focused consumers; the studies also 
elucidate the processes underlying these effects. In addition, the promotion-balancing effect, but 
not the prevention-repetition effect, disappears if the second decision is unambiguously moral or 
immoral. These findings contribute to a better understanding of morality in the marketplace by 
showing that the prevention-repetition effect from psychology literature arises in consumption 
situations, and the promotion-balancing effect emerges as a new consumer behavior 
phenomenon.  
 
Keywords: regulatory focus, moral self-regulation, moral licensing, moral cleansing, moral 
consistency, moral consumption 
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Moral decisions in the marketplace are not made in isolation; they depend on prior moral 
decisions (Zhang, Cornwell, & Higgins, 2014; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). Sequential 
moral decisions may feature conflicts, between acting morally and pursuing one’s self-interest in 
initial versus subsequent decisions (Huber, Goldmith, & Mogilner, 2008), such that consumers 
constantly calibrate their moral stances (Zhong et al., 2009). For example, consumers trade off 
today’s purchase of inexpensive, conventional groceries against more expensive, environmentally 
responsible products, or the future benefit of donating money to charity versus the pleasure of 
spending money on themselves.  
Prior research proposes two possible routes for, and thus theoretical viewpoints regarding, 
consumers’ sequential moral decision making (e.g., Huber et al., 2008): moral balancing and 
moral consistency. Moral balancing means that consumers deviate from the moral stance 
reflected in their past decisions, such that they balance their moral and immoral decisions and act 
more morally after an initial immoral decision and more immorally after previous moral behavior 
(Conway & Peetz, 2012; Gneezy, Imas, Brown, Nelson, & Norton, 2012; Jeong & Koo, 2015; 
Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). For example, consumers may donate less money to a charity 
after buying cause-related products (Krishna, 2011), are more likely to cheat and lie after buying 
green products (Mazar & Zhong, 2010), and tend to prefer hedonic over utilitarian products after 
volunteering or donating (Khan & Dhar, 2006). 
In contrast, moral consistency implies that consumers persist with their moral history, and 
with this consistent behavior, people act more morally after prior moral decisions and more 
immorally after an initial immoral decision (Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 
2010). Karmarkar and Bollinger (2015), for example, show that retail shoppers who bring their 
own bags to the store purchase more organic products, and Cornelissen, Pandelaere, Warlop, and 
Dewitte (2008) reveal that reminding consumers of their past environmentally friendly behaviors 
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increases their probability of choosing environmentally friendly products subsequently. Although 
research thus has identified and examined both moral self-regulation routes, the question of when 
and why past behavior induces consumers to be consistent or else licenses them to balance out 
their behavior remains under-researched (Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015; Merritt, 
Effron, & Monin, 2010).  
Zhang et al. (2014) made some strides in understanding sequential moral decision making. 
Building on regulatory focus theory (RFT), they establish a prevention-repetition effect in 
different ethical (but not consumption-related) domains, noting that people with a strong 
prevention focus repeat both their prior moral and immoral behaviors in subsequent decisions. 
However, they find no effect of initial decisions on subsequent behavior among promotion-
focused participants. Zhang et al. theorize (but do not empirically test) that the prevention-
repetition effect is based on prevention-focused people’s motivation to maintain the status quo 
established by a prior decision. Despite these intriguing findings, there is limited understanding 
of when and why regulatory focus influences consumers’ moral self-regulation and thus their 
consumption behavior. 
We attempt to contribute such an understanding of consumers’ moral self-regulation (i.e., 
moral balancing and moral consistency) by building on and extending Zhang et al.’s (2014) 
findings. First, drawing on RFT, we reveal that the prevention-repetition effect they report arises 
in moral consumption situations too. We shed light on the mechanism underlying this effect and 
empirically test the mediating role of motivation to maintain the status quo. We find that prior 
moral and immoral decisions increase prevention-focused consumers’ motivation to maintain the 
status quo, resulting in morally congruent subsequent consumption behavior. This study offers 
the first empirical examination of the mediating role of consumers’ motivation to maintain the 
status quo in relation to moral self-regulation.  
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Second, we add to recent literature on moral balancing by showing that the balancing effect 
occurs only for promotion-focused consumers; within this group, the balancing effect also is 
contingent on the moral ambiguity of the target behavior, or whether the subsequent decision is 
unequivocally or ambiguously moral or immoral. In particular, moral balancing occurs for 
consumers with a strong promotion focus but not for those with a strong prevention focus, yet the 
balancing effect also disappears for promotion-focused consumers if the target behavior (i.e., 
second decision) is unambiguously moral or immoral. With this finding, we help explain the low 
effect sizes of moral balancing, such as Blanken et al.’s (2015) meta-analytical finding of an 
average effect size of Cohen’s d = .31 for the moral licensing effect. Our results also can explain 
non-significant balancing effects among promotion-focused people in psychology literature 
(Zhang et al., 2014).  
Third, we identify and test the mechanism underlying the moral balancing effect for 
promotion-focused consumers. After their prior moral behavior, promotion-focused consumers 
perceive progress toward the goal of having a moral self-image, which licenses their subsequent 
ambiguous transgressions. An initial immoral decision negatively influences their goal progress 
though, leading to compensatory (i.e., more moral) behavior thereafter (moral cleansing). 
Overall, this research contributes to a better understanding of consumers’ moral self-regulation in 
the marketplace. Accordingly, we first briefly discuss consumers’ moral self-regulation and the 
role of regulatory focus, as well as a moderating and two mediating factors. Then, we derive our 
hypotheses and provide an overview of our four experimental studies. We next turn to the 
experiments and conclude with a discussion of our findings.  
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Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
 Moral consumption behavior and consumers’ moral self-regulation 
In (moral) consumption situations, consumers often face a trade-off between contributing to 
the welfare of others (e.g., paying a higher price for a fair trade food product to ensure farmers 
make a livable income) and pursuing their own self-interests (e.g., paying a lower price for a 
conventional product; Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Joosten, van Dijke, Van 
Hiel, & De Cremer, 2014). In this context, moral consumption behavior demonstrates “social 
responsiveness to the needs and interests of others” (Aquino et al., 2009, p. 124) and “benefits the 
welfare of others, the environment, or society as a whole” (Susewind & Hoelzl, 2014, p. 201). 
Purchasing green products thus is perceived as more moral than selecting conventional products 
(Eskine, 2013; Karmarkar & Bollinger, 2015; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Susewind & Hoelzl, 2014) 
because green products benefit the environment more. With this definition, we also predict that 
moral consumption behavior can take the form of donating to charity instead of keeping money 
for oneself, honestly reporting undercharges on a bill to a service employee, or purchasing 
clothing made from recycled materials for a higher price than conventional clothing. In contrast, 
pursuing one’s self-interests rather than considering the welfare of others is considered less moral 
or even immoral (Aquino et al., 2009; Susewind & Hoelzl, 2014). In line with this 
conceptualization, Mazar and Zhong (2010) show that purchasing conventional products can be 
established as less moral than selecting green products. 
The desire to act in a moral way and keep a positive moral self-view is inherent to most 
consumers (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Mazar & Zhong, 2010) though not always reflected in 
actual consumer behavior. Consumers have competing goals and self-regulate their moral 
consumption behavior, which involves moving toward or away from goals, following an internal 
guidance system (Carver & Scheier, 2001). In this process, past decisions influence subsequent 
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consumption behavior through two alternative, equally important routes (Huber et al., 2008). The 
moral consistency route suggests that people repeat their past decisions, regardless of whether 
they were pleasant or unpleasant (e.g., Ariely, 2008; Gawronski & Strack, 2012). The moral 
balancing route suggests behavior in one moral direction leads consumers to behave in opposite 
moral directions subsequently (e.g., Jeong & Koo, 2015; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Mazar & Zhong, 
2010). The route that consumers follow likely is driven by their internal guidance system, 
specifically, their inherent or induced self-regulatory system.  
Regulatory focus as a motivational principle in moral self-regulation 
Regulatory focus theory proposes that a person’s regulatory focus, as a strategic orientation 
for approaching goals, has important consequences for self-regulative processes (Chernev, 2004; 
Higgins, 1997, 2002). It distinguishes two self-regulatory systems: a promotion focus that centers 
on achieving aspirations, advancement, and gains, and a prevention focus that is associated with 
goals of safety, responsibilities, and non-losses. These distinct self-regulatory systems result in 
different self-regulation processes, depending on whether they get activated by vigilant avoidance 
strategies (prevention) or eager approach strategies (promotion) (Higgins, 1997). In turn, we 
propose that their regulatory focus influences whether consumers strive for advancement (and 
balance their moral and immoral decisions in subsequent consumption decisions) or seek security 
(and repeat their moral or immoral behavior). 
Due to their desire to accomplish security goals, people with a strong prevention focus (cf. 
strongly promotion-focused people) assign more weight to the negative consequences of 
deviating from the security of the status quo (Chernev, 2004; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & 
Higgins, 2010), such that they are inclined toward stability and conservative strategies (Crowe & 
Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999; Zhou & Pham, 
2004). In terms of sequential moral consumption behavior, the prior decisions of prevention-
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focused people constitute the status quo and serve as a heuristic for subsequent decision making 
(Chernev, 2004; Scholer et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2014). A moral decision increases the relative 
importance of morality goals and leads to more moral subsequent consumption behavior. 
Following the same line of thought, immoral decisions by prevention-focused people highlight 
their self-interests, and the immoral decision constitutes the status quo to maintain in subsequent 
choices. Even immoral decisions can result in a higher willingness to maintain that status quo, 
constituted by prior behavior, leading to a repetition of immoral decisions.  
This reasoning receives support from Zhang, Higgins, and Chen (2011), who show that 
people with a strong prevention focus copy even the behavior of a role model with whom they 
have been unsatisfied, to maintain their status quo. Wu and Kao (2011) find that such consumers 
seek less variety than promotion-focused consumers; in turn, less variety seeking is positively 
associated with repetitive behavior in sequential moral decisions (Huber et al., 2008). In showing 
that prevention-focused people are motivated and inclined to repeat both their prior moral (e.g., 
telling the truth) and immoral (e.g., cheating, hiding information) behavior, Zhang et al. (2014) 
critically identify what they call the prevention-repetition effect. In accordance with their findings 
and prior reasoning, we expect the prevention-repetition effect to arise for moral consumption 
decisions too.  
H1: Among prevention-focused consumers, prior (a) moral consumption decisions lead to 
more moral behavior in subsequent consumption decisions, and (b) immoral decisions 
lead to more immoral subsequent consumption behavior. 
In contrast, consumers with a strong promotion focus pursue progress, positive outcomes, 
and advancement toward a desired end state (Higgins, 1997, 1998; Semin, Higgins, de Montes, 
Estourget, & Valencia, 2005). They are motivated to do whatever it takes to make progress from 
a status quo to a new, better state; they do not attach value to the status quo but instead value 
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advancement away from the current state toward a desired end state (Scholer et al., 2010). Goal 
progress, defined as how much advancement they perceive that they have made toward achieving 
an objective, serves as a signal to guide promotion-focused consumers’ self-regulative decisions 
(Salerno, Laran, & Janiszewski, 2015; Zou, Scholer, & Higgins, 2014). After some advancement, 
their sufficient goal progress signals that they can decrease their efforts and shift their focus to 
other goals (Carver, 2003; Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 2009). Their prior 
moral decisions constitute progress toward the goal of developing a self-image of being a moral 
person; this progress licenses less moral decisions and a greater focus on one’s self-interests 
subsequently (Huber et al., 2008; Joosten et al., 2014; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Zhong et al., 2009). 
However, this licensing mechanism applies only if the second decision is morally ambiguous 
enough to avoid an attribution of immorality to oneself (e.g., choosing not to donate money to a 
particular charity). Unequivocally immoral behavior, such as cheating or lying, cannot be 
licensed by prior moral actions (see the subsequent development of H3 and H4). Rather, the prior 
immoral decisions of promotion-focused consumers satisfy their self-interested goals and do not 
constitute progress toward the goal of a moral self-image, signaling the need for them to intensify 
their efforts (Carver & Scheier, 2001; Fishbach et al., 2009; Zou et al., 2014). They thus are 
motivated to compensate for prior wrongdoings with subsequent moral consumption decisions.  
This reasoning is in line with prevalent literature suggesting that a stronger promotion focus 
is associated with greater deviation from the status quo, more openness to change, and greater 
risk seeking (Chernev, 2004; Liberman et al., 1999; Zhou & Pham, 2004). A stronger outcome-
based mindset also is associated with balance across sequential decisions (Cornelissen, Bashshur, 
Rode, & Le Menestrel, 2013). Balancing conflicting goals occurs when people are motivated to 
seek variety (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Huber et al., 2008), such that variety-seeking behavior is 
more pronounced among promotion-focused people (Wu & Kao, 2011). We expect consumers 
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with a strong promotion focus to balance their subsequent moral consumption decisions and 
exhibit more immoral consumption behavior after prior moral consumption decisions (moral 
licensing) but act more morally after more immoral consumption (moral cleansing). 
H2: For promotion-focused consumers, prior (a) moral consumption decisions lead to more 
immoral behavior in subsequent consumption decisions, but (b) immoral decisions 
lead to more moral subsequent consumption behavior. 
Moral ambiguity of the target behavior 
Moral decision-making situations differ in their moral ambiguity, that is, the degree to 
which decisions have a clearly moral or immoral bent (Mullen & Monin, 2016). In situations with 
low moral ambiguity, the decision maker can choose between an unequivocally moral alternative 
and a blatant moral transgression—for example, between being honest or cheating. In contrast, 
decision situations with high moral ambiguity are characterized by some lack of certainty about 
whether certain behaviors are morally right or wrong, such as denying a bank loan to a gay 
couple (Krumm & Corning, 2008).  
For prevention-focused consumers, what matters most is maintaining the security of the 
status quo. The morality of the past behavior (i.e., previous moral decision) determines this status 
quo and serves as a heuristic for subsequent decision making (Chernev, 2004; Scholer et al., 
2010; Zhang et al., 2014). In other words, prevention-focused people rely on their initial behavior 
as the reference point for subsequent decisions. The ambiguity of the target behavior is not 
relevant for the decision; these prevention-focused people are willing to “do whatever is 
necessary to return to the previous status quo” (Scholer et al., 2010, p. 217). Thus Zhang et al. 
(2014) demonstrate that prevention-focused people repeat their prior moral and immoral 
decisions, even in situations marked by clear moral transgressions such as lying or cheating. 
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Therefore, we expect prevention-focused consumers to repeat both prior moral and immoral 
decisions subsequently, in situations with either high or low moral ambiguity. 
However, moral ambiguity is central to the process of moral rationalization. People are able 
to interpret their immoral behavior to establish a perception of that behavior as acceptable, 
neutral, or even moral in some cases. This reinterpretation of immoral behavior reflects the 
person’s ability to provide alternative explanations (Brown et al., 2011). Especially in morally 
ambiguous situations, people can find alternative explanations to deny immoral motivations, 
causes, or actions and thus give them excuses for not living up to their own ethical standards 
(Mullen & Monin, 2016). For example, people who are not willing to donate money to a charity 
may explain their unwillingness by claiming they want to give to another charitable cause at 
some later point. This rationalization helps promotion-focused consumers uphold their moral 
self-perception, despite acting immorally, as well as give in to the temptation of acting immorally 
after prior moral decisions to advance toward self-interested goals (Mullen & Monin, 2016).  
If the first decision is immoral, a subsequent decision with high moral ambiguity provides 
an easy way of cleansing prior wrongdoings and making progress toward the goal of being a 
moral person. Therefore, promotion-focused consumers take this chance and act more morally 
after prior immoral decisions when the target behavior is highly morally ambiguous. If the second 
decision is unambiguously moral or immoral though, the moral option constitutes the dominant 
choice for promotion-focused consumers, due to its better relation of gains and losses relative to 
the immoral option. That is, promotion-focused consumers strive for gains and to capture 
opportunities (Zhou & Pham, 2004), so they naturally gravitate toward the moral option, 
regardless of their prior behavior. The moral ambiguity of the target behavior (low vs. high 
ambiguity) therefore should be irrelevant for the moral self-regulation of prevention-focused 
consumers but highly relevant to the self-regulative processes of promotion-focused people. We 
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expect the moral balancing effect of promotion-focused consumers to disappear for target 
behaviors with low moral ambiguity, which would provide a compelling explanation for variance 
in promotion-related research findings (Zhang et al., 2014).  
H3: When the target behavior has high moral ambiguity, (a) prevention-focused consumers 
repeat their prior moral (immoral) decisions, and (b) promotion-focused consumers 
balance their prior moral (immoral) decisions with subsequent more immoral (moral) 
consumption behavior. 
H4: When the target behavior has low moral ambiguity, (a) prevention-focused consumers 
repeat their moral (immoral) decisions, and (b) promotion-focused consumers refrain 
from balancing their moral consumption behavior. 
Status quo maintenance and goal progress  
As outlined, prevention-focused consumers repeat both prior moral and immoral decisions. 
In line with Zhang et al. (2014), we posit that this repetitive behavior is motivated by a desire to 
maintain the status quo established by past behavior, that is, a motivation not to deviate from 
prior decisions for security needs and to repeat the moral stance reflected by past behavior 
(Chernev, 2004; Scholer et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2014). We therefore test whether the 
motivation to maintain the status quo mediates the prevention–repetition effect. Specifically, we 
expect a motivation to maintain the status quo to mediate the influence of both prior moral and 
immoral consumption behavior on subsequent decisions by prevention-focused consumers.  
H5: Prevention-focused consumers are motivated to maintain the status quo after moral 
(immoral) consumption decisions, which results in more moral (immoral) consumption 
behavior subsequently.  
For consumers with a strong promotion focus, and in line with our reasoning leading to H2, 
the influence of their prior moral and immoral consumption behavior on subsequent decisions 
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may be mediated by perceived progress toward the goal of acting morally. After prior moral 
decisions, perceived goal progress signals that the goal of acting morally has been sufficiently 
satisfied, which permits less moral behavior subsequently (Carver, 2003; Fishbach & Dhar, 
2005). Immoral decisions entail a perceived lack of progress toward the goal of acting morally 
though, resulting in more moral subsequent consumption decisions (Carver & Scheier, 2001; 
Fishbach et al., 2009; Zou et al., 2014).  
H6: For promotion-focused consumers, a prior moral (immoral) consumption decision 
positively (negatively) affects perceived progress toward the goal of acting morally, 
which results in less (more) moral consumption behavior subsequently.  
Overview of experimental studies 
We report on four experimental studies to test the effect of a consumer’s regulatory focus 
on his or her moral self-regulation (Table 1). Study 1 shows that consumers with a situationally 
induced prevention focus repeat their past consumption decisions, but consumers with a 
situationally induced promotion focus regulate their moral consumption behavior through 
licensing and cleansing. Study 2 replicates the findings from Study 1 in a different consumption 
context. Study 3 sheds light on the moderating role of the moral ambiguity of the target behavior, 
that is, whether the second decision is clearly or ambiguously moral or immoral. For target 
behavior that is clearly moral or immoral, prevention-focused consumers still repeat their prior 
moral and immoral decisions, but promotion-focused consumers no longer regulate their moral 
consumption behavior through licensing and cleansing. Finally, in Study 4, we elaborate on the 
mechanisms underlying prevention-focused consumers’ moral consistency and promotion-
focused consumers’ moral balancing by testing the mediating roles of motivation to maintain the 
status quo and perceived goal progress. 
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Study 1: Effect of regulatory focus on consumers’ moral self-regulation 
Design and procedure 
To test our predictions that a consumers’ regulatory focus influences moral self-regulatory 
consumption behavior, we manipulated the morality of the first decision that the Study 1 
participants saw, as well as the induced regulatory focus. Thus, this experiment used a 3 (first 
decision: moral vs. immoral vs. control)  2 (regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) 
between-subjects design.  
After excluding participants who made mistakes in completing the tasks (see the 
Methodological Details Appendix [MDA]), the final convenience sample consisted of 182 
students and employees of a major German university (50.5% male; Mage = 26.54 years, SDage = 
10.61 years), recruited to participate in a laboratory experiment. Participants in the control 
condition completed an unrelated scrambled sentence task. Comparisons of the outcomes in the 
moral and immoral conditions against this control group are important to differentiate positive 
from negative consistency and licensing from cleansing behavior (Mullen & Monin, 2016).  
Measures 
Dependent variable. We used a scale that assesses intentions to purchase green versus 
conventional groceries as a measure of the morality of the subsequent consumption decision; 
buying green products allows consumers to express their high ethical standards and social 
responsibility (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). In particular, we chose organic and conventional coffee, 
considering the relevance of this product category to consumers (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2016). Participants received short product descriptions that differed in one feature: 
One coffee was labeled organic, but we omitted this detail for the conventional coffee. 
Furthermore, the indicated price of the organic coffee was one-third higher than that of the 
conventional coffee (for equivalent package sizes). Participants indicated their relative preference 
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for organic versus conventional coffee on a 7-point scale (1 = most likely to buy the premium 
coffee and 7 = most likely to buy the organic premium coffee). The MDA provides details about 
the materials and scales we used. 
Regulatory focus. We used the manipulation developed by Freitas and Higgins (2002) to 
induce a prevention or promotion focus, as has been applied effectively in many other studies 
(e.g., Kirmani & Zhu, 2007; Yoon, Sarial-Abi, & Gürhan-Canli, 2012). In the prevention focus 
condition, participants described two of their duties and obligations and wrote a short paragraph 
about them. In the promotion focus condition, we asked participants to think about their current 
hopes and aspirations and write a short paragraph about two of them. In line with prior research 
(e.g., Yoon et al., 2012), we also included four questions to check the adequacy of the regulatory 
focus manipulation (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree): “My major goal right now is 
to achieve my ambitions,” “I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and 
obligations,” “I am more oriented toward preventing losses than I am toward achieving gains,” 
and “I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations” (adapted from 
Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002). We averaged the first and last items for an overall 
promotion focus score (composite reliability [CR] = .69); the aggregation of items 2 and 3 
measured prevention focus (CR = .67).  
Morality of the first decision. We manipulated the morality of the first decision using a 
moral behavior recall task adapted from Conway and Peetz (2012). Participants in the moral 
recall condition were asked to remember a situation, dating back less than one year, in which they 
helped someone without any reward or were caring or kind without pursuing their own self-
interests. We also suggested that the situation could have involved being loyal or generous when 
they could have been selfish. In the immoral recall conditions, participants remembered situations 
in which they were mean or unfriendly without any particular reason, such as when they acted 
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disloyally or selfishly. Next, the participants had to write a short paragraph about the situation 
they remembered. In the control condition, participants executed an unrelated scrambled sentence 
task. We checked for the success of the manipulation of the morality of the first decision with 
four items from Khan and Dhar (2006): “In the described situation, I was 
compassionate/sympathetic/warm/helpful” (7-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly 
agree; CR = .92).  
Results 
Manipulation checks. To check if regulatory focus was successfully manipulated, we 
conducted two two-way analyses of variance (ANOVA), with the regulatory focus manipulation 
checks as the dependent variables and regulatory focus and the morality of the first decision as 
the independent variables. As expected, participants in the prevention focus condition scored 
higher on the prevention focus manipulation check than those in the promotion focus condition 
(Mprevention = 4.06, Mpromotion = 3.47; F(1, 176) = 8.17, p < .01). Furthermore, we found a 
significant main effect of regulatory focus on the promotion focus measure, such that participants 
in the promotion focus condition showed a stronger promotion focus than those in the prevention 
focus condition (Mpromotion = 5.77, Mprevention = 5.20; F(1, 176) = 11.72, p < .001). No other main 
or interaction effects were significant in the regulatory focus manipulation checks.  
In another two-way ANOVA, the manipulation check measure of the first decision’s 
morality was the dependent variable, and the morality of the first decision and regulatory focus 
were independent variables. As intended, we found a significant main effect of the morality of the 
first decision but no other statistically significant main or interaction effects. Participants in the 
moral behavior condition rated the perceived morality of the first decision higher than did 
participants in the control condition (F(1, 176) = 159.48, p < .001; Mmoral = 5.77, Mcontrol = 4.25, 
pmoral/control < .001). The immoral behavior condition was assessed as less moral than the control 
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condition (M immoral = 2.39, Mcontrol = 4.25, pimmoral/control < .001). These results confirm the success 
of the manipulation. 
Hypotheses testing. To examine H1 and H2, we conducted a two-way ANOVA with the 
relative preference for the organic coffee as the dependent variable and regulatory focus and the 
morality of the first decision as independent variables. The main effects of the morality of the 
first decision (F(2, 176) = .06, p > .05) and regulatory focus (F(1, 176) = .08, p > .05) were not 
significant. However, the ANOVA revealed the predicted two-way interaction between the 
morality of the first decision and regulatory focus (F(2, 176) = 28.05, p < .001), as shown in 
Figure 1. To scrutinize this interaction, we analyzed the effect of the first decision on the relative 
preference for organic coffee among prevention- and promotion-focused participants separately. 
In support of both H1a and H1b, in the prevention-focused condition, relative preference for the 
organic coffee was higher among participants who previously recalled moral behavior (F(2, 92) = 
18.83, p < .001; Mmoral = 5.24, Mcontrol = 4.13, pmoral/control < .05, Cohen’s d = .67). Participants with 
an induced prevention focus in the immoral behavior recall condition expressed a lower relative 
preference for organic coffee than those in the control condition (Mimmoral = 2.65, Mcontrol = 4.13, 
pimmoral/control < .001, d = .81). Also consistent with H2a and H2b, in the promotion focus 
condition, participants exhibited balancing behavior: After recalling moral behavior, their relative 
preference for organic coffee was lower than in the control condition (F(2, 84) = 10.64, p < .001; 
Mmoral = 2.85; Mcontrol = 4.09, pmoral/control < .05, d = .60). Promotion-focused participants who 
recalled more immoral behavior instead had a higher relative preference for organic coffee 
compared with the control condition (Mimmoral = 5.33, Mcontrol = 4.09, pimmoral/control < .05, d = .60).  
Discussion 
Study 1 provides support for our reasoning that consumers’ (situationally induced) 
regulatory focus influences whether they regulate or repeat their moral consumption decisions. 
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For prevention-focused consumers, our results are consistent with findings by Zhang et al. 
(2014): An induced prevention focus causes consumers to repeat their past behavior, irrespective 
of the morality of the decision. Thus, the prevention-repetition effect applies to moral 
consumption too. Promotion-focused participants who previously recalled moral decisions 
exhibited licensing behavioral patterns, but participants in the promotion focus condition who 
remembered past immoral decisions instead tried to “clean up” their behavior with more moral 
behavior subsequently. Whereas an induced promotion focus leads to moral licensing and moral 
cleansing patterns in consumption domains in our study, Zhang et al. (2014) found no effect of 
promotion focus on sequential moral behavior in their psychology research. The inconsistency in 
these findings prompted us to replicate our results in another consumption context in Study 2.  
Study 2: Replicating the effect of regulatory focus on consumers’ moral self-regulation 
Design and procedure 
In Study 2, we examine if the effects from Study 1 replicate in another consumption 
situation, namely, whether to keep or donate a reward paid to a customer for helping a firm 
acquire new customers. By manipulating the morality of the first decision and consumers’ 
regulatory focus, we devised a 3 (first decision: moral vs. immoral vs. control)  2 (regulatory 
focus: prevention vs. promotion) between-subjects design. A total of 179 students and university 
employees of a major German university were recruited for the laboratory experiment, through 
random approach tactics on campus. We excluded 3 participants who did not execute the writing 
task correctly, resulting in a final sample of 176 participants (39.80% male; Mage = 26.04 years, 
SDage = 8.93 years). Participants did not receive any monetary compensation but had the chance 
to take part in a raffle, as detailed subsequently.  
    19 
  
 
 
Measures 
Dependent variable. The choice in the moral trade-off was the dependent measure. 
Participants had to imagine being customers of the mobile phone company “Now Mobile,” who 
could receive a reward of €15 (~$17.50) for recruiting a friend as a new customer through a 
referral program. They had a choice between keeping the reward for themselves or donating the 
money to a fictitious charity, “Against Hunger,” which we described in the instrument. The 
dichotomous dependent variable was 0 = keep the reward and 1 = donate the reward. 
Regulatory focus. The regulatory focus manipulation and manipulation checks were the 
same as in Study 1 (CRprevention = .60; CRpromotion = .61).  
Morality of the first decision. Following Mazar and Zhong (2010), we manipulated the 
first decision by letting participants choose from nine convenience goods (e.g., coffee, potato 
chips, shampoo) that they would like to buy. In the more moral condition, participants were 
shown seven green and two conventional convenience goods; in the more immoral condition, 
seven conventional and two green convenience goods appeared. Participants then chose products 
to reach a maximum total value of €20 (~$23.50; each product ranged in price between €2 and 
€5) and also were told that they could participate in a raffle in which one of every 25 participants 
would be chosen to receive the selected products, thereby incentivizing them to choose as many 
products as possible. Participants in the moral condition (7 green and 2 conventional alternatives) 
chose more green than conventional products; participants in the immoral condition (7 
conventional and 2 green alternatives) ended up selecting more conventional than green products. 
In the moral condition, on average, participants selected 4.07 green products and .60 conventional 
products. In the immoral condition, they chose an average of .88 conventional and 3.78 green 
products. In line with Mazar and Zhong (2010) and Susewind and Hoelzl (2014), we kept the 
prices the same for the green and conventional alternatives, such that choosing the more moral 
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alternative no longer requires self-sacrifice. In turn, opting for conventional products in this 
situation should be interpreted as even more immoral than if self-sacrifice were necessary to act 
morally. Participants in the control condition completed the same unrelated scrambled sentence 
task as in Study 1. The test of the effectiveness of the manipulation used three items adapted from 
Mazar and Zhong (2010): “With my product choice I acted socially responsibly,” “My product 
choice was ethical,” and “With my product choice I acted altruistically” (CR = .80). The items 
were assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree).  
Results 
Manipulation checks. To determine if regulatory focus was manipulated successfully, we 
conducted two two-way ANOVAs, with the regulatory focus manipulation checks as the 
dependent variables and regulatory focus and the morality of the first decision as independent 
variables. As expected, the prevention focus manipulation resulted in a higher prevention focus 
score than the promotion focus manipulation (Mprevention = 4.28, Mpromotion = 3.44; F(1, 170) = 
16.96, p < .001). Participants in the promotion focus condition also scored higher on the 
promotion focus measure than participants in the prevention focus condition (Mpromotion = 4.27, 
Mprevention = 3.51; F(1, 170) = 14.40, p < .001). The ANOVAs did not yield any other statistically 
significant main or interaction effects.  
Another two-way ANOVA with the morality manipulation check as the dependent variable 
and the morality of the first decision and regulatory focus as the independent variables yielded a 
significant main effect of the morality of the first decision; none of the other main or interaction 
effects were statistically significant. In support of our manipulation, the cell means revealed that 
participants who chose from seven green and two conventional convenience goods rated the first 
decision as more moral than participants in the control condition (F(2, 170) = 14.97, p < .001); 
Mmoral = 4.51, Mcontrol = 3.91, pmoral/control < .001). Participants who were exposed to seven 
    21 
  
 
 
conventional and two green convenience goods rated their decision as less moral than in the 
control condition (Mimmoral = 3.24, Mcontrol = 3.91, pimmoral/control < .05).  
Hypotheses testing. To replicate the findings for H1 and H2, we conducted a binary 
logistic regression, with the choice between keeping or donating the reward as the dependent 
variable and the morality of the first decision, regulatory focus, and their two-way interaction as 
independent variables (see Table 2 and Figure 2). The morality of the first decision had a 
significant main effect on donation probability (Wald χ²(2) = 15.92, p < .001), but regulatory 
focus did not yield a main effect (b = -.25, Wald χ²(1) = .24, p > .05).  
Notably, the two-way interaction between the morality of the first decision and regulatory 
focus had a significant effect on donation probability (Wald χ²(2) = 31.24, p < .001). To clarify 
this interaction, we analyzed the simple slopes of regulatory focus in each morality condition, 
which reveals a repetition of the effects we established in Study 1: Consumers with an induced 
prevention focus were more willing to donate the reward after having selected more green 
convenience goods than those in the control condition (b = 1.20, Wald χ²(1) = 3.83, p = .05). 
After choosing more conventional convenience goods, prevention-focused participants were less 
willing to donate the reward than participants in the control condition (b = -1.33, Wald χ²(1) = 
5.90, p < .05). Promotion-focused participants indicated a higher probability of donating to the 
charity after having chosen from more conventional convenience goods, compared with 
promotion-focused participants who completed a neutral filler task (b = 1.27, Wald χ²(1) = 4.66, 
p < .05). After selecting more green convenience goods, participants in the promotion focus 
condition showed a lower donation likelihood than participants in the control condition (b = -
1.21, Wald χ²(1) = 4.51, p < .05).  
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Discussion 
Study 2 lends further support to the robustness of our Study 1 findings. We show that the 
prevention-repetition effect proposed by Zhang et al. (2014) replicates in another consumption 
situation (i.e., donating a reward received for making a successful referral). Whereas Zhang et al. 
(2014) found no effects of prior moral decisions on subsequent behavior among promotion-
focused people, our study corroborates that, in consumer behavior settings, a higher promotion 
focus causes consumers to balance prior and subsequent moral consumption decisions. In Study 
3, we seek to explain the divergence of our results from those of Zhang et al. (2014) by analyzing 
a contingency of the promotion effect, namely, the moral ambiguity of the target behavior (i.e., 
second decision). 
Study 3: Moral ambiguity of the target behavior 
Design and procedure 
In Study 3, we manipulated consumers’ regulatory focus, the morality of the first decision, 
and the moral ambiguity of the target behavior, with a 3 (first decision: moral vs. immoral vs. 
control)  2 (regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion)  2 (moral ambiguity of target behavior: 
low vs. high) between-subjects design. After excluding 4 participants (see the MDA), the final 
convenience sample consisted of 369 students and staff from a large German university (42% 
male; Mage = 22.98 years, SDage = 3.37 years). The experiment consisted of three reportedly 
unrelated parts of a study. Participants were incentivized by a chance to take part in a raffle. 
Measures 
Dependent variable. A scenario with a service mistake in the customer’s favor served as 
the dependent variable. More precisely, we described a restaurant scenario, in which consumers 
received a bill with missing items (see the MDA for further details). Participants were told that 
they recognized the mistake, then indicated whether they would point out the mistake to the 
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waiter on a 7-point scale (1 = most likely to not point out the mistake and 7 = most likely to point 
out the mistake).  
Moral ambiguity of the target behavior. For the high moral ambiguity manipulation, we 
noted that the participant chose the restaurant’s dish of the day, which had been listed on a 
blackboard near the restaurant entrance. When checking the bill, the guest noticed a lower price 
than what he or she believed had been written on the blackboard. It is an ambiguous situation, 
because multiple explanations could exist; for example, the guest may decide to not point out the 
mistake because he or she is not entirely sure to have remembered the price on the blackboard 
correctly. Thus, the negative behavior can be viewed in a more favorable light, suggesting the 
situation creates more attributional ambiguity (Merritt et al., 2010; Mullen & Monin, 2016). In 
the low ambiguity condition, participants instead read that the dish was completely omitted from 
the bill. In this situation, not pointing out the mistake reflects less ambiguous moral behavior; 
there is no alternative possible explanation (i.e., the consumer knows full well his or her behavior 
is a moral transgression). To check this manipulation, we asked participants to use three 7-point 
bipolar items and indicate whether failing to point out the mistake is “unambiguously immoral–
ambiguously immoral,” “certainly immoral–not really immoral,” or “in either case immoral–not 
in every case immoral” (CR = .93) (adapted from Nordholm, 1975; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2011).  
A pretest with 44 graduate students of a major German university (62.20% male; Mage = 
23.11 years, SDage = 3.04) confirmed that the scenarios were perceived as situations marked by 
higher or lower moral ambiguity. Not pointing out that the dish appeared on the bill with a lower 
price was perceived as more ambiguously immoral, less certainly immoral, and less definitely 
immoral (Mhigh = 4.18) than not pointing out that the dish was completely missing (Mlow = 2.73; 
t(43) = -2.93, p < .01). Thus, our manipulation of moral ambiguity was successful.  
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Regulatory focus. We applied the same regulatory focus manipulation and manipulation 
checks as in the Studies 1 and 2 (CRpromotion = .82; CRprevention = .60). 
Morality of the first decision. To manipulate participants’ first decision, we applied the 
scenario with nine different convenience goods from Study 2 to a clothing context. Participants 
were instructed to make purchase decisions, using vouchers ranging in value from €2 to €5. They 
chose from a set of nine vouchers redeemable for green versus conventional clothes (e.g., t-shirts, 
jeans, underwear). In the moral (immoral) condition, the set contained 7 vouchers for green 
(conventional) clothes and 2 for conventional (green) clothes. The sets did not differ in their 
prices or ratio of green and conventional alternatives. In the moral condition, participants selected 
an average of 4.49 green clothing vouchers and .55 conventional vouchers. In the immoral 
condition, they chose an average of 4 conventional and 1.09 green clothing vouchers. They also 
had an opportunity to take part in a raffle and actually receive the chosen vouchers. We used the 
same manipulation check as in Study 2 (CR = .80). Participants in the control condition filled in 
an unrelated scrambled sentence task (as in Studies 1 and 2). 
Results 
Manipulation checks. Two three-way ANOVAs with the promotion/prevention 
manipulation check measures as the dependent variables and morality of the first decision, 
regulatory focus, and moral ambiguity as independent variables showed that the prevention focus 
manipulation check measure was higher for participants in the prevention than in the promotion 
condition (Mprevention = 3.90, Mpromotion = 3.28; F(1, 357) = 15.18, p < .001). Participants in the 
promotion focus condition also scored higher on the promotion focus items than those in the 
prevention focus condition (Mpromotion = 5.69, Mprevention = 5.03; F(1, 357) = 30.33, p < .001). 
We conducted another three-way ANOVA with the morality manipulation check as the 
dependent variable and the morality of the first decision, regulatory focus, and moral ambiguity 
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as independent variables. Participants in the moral condition rated the first decision as more 
moral than participants in the control condition (F(2, 357) = 20.25, p < .001; Mmoral = 4.45, Mcontrol 
= 3.87, pmoral/control < .01). Furthermore, the rating of the immoral condition was lower than in the 
control group (Mmoral = 3.43, Mcontrol = 3.92, pimmoral/control < .05). As expected, we did not find 
other statistically significant main or interaction effects.  
To check the manipulation of moral ambiguity, we conducted a three-way ANOVA with 
the manipulation check as the dependent variable and moral ambiguity, regulatory focus, and the 
morality of the first decision as independent variables. In support of our manipulation, 
participants in the high ambiguity condition perceived not pointing out the mistake as more 
ambiguously immoral than those in the low ambiguity condition (Mlow = 2.78, Mhigh = 4.02; F(1, 
357) = 49.42, p < .001). There were no other statistically significant main or interaction effects. 
Hypotheses testing. To test H3 and H4, we conducted a three-way ANOVA with the 
intention to point out the service mistake as the dependent variable and regulatory focus, the 
morality of the first decision, and moral ambiguity as independent variables. The results revealed 
that ambiguity decreased intentions to point out the mistake (F(1, 357) = 36.98, p < .001). 
Moreover, the ANOVA yielded a significant three-way interaction among regulatory focus, the 
morality of the first decision, and moral ambiguity (F(2, 357) = 4.47, p < .05). By examining the 
effect separately for the high and low ambiguity conditions, we can confirm H3a and H3b as well 
as H4a and H4b. As the results in Figure 3 show, for situations with more moral ambiguity, we 
replicate our findings from Studies 1 and 2; participants with a stronger prevention focus repeated 
their prior behavior and expressed a higher willingness to point out the service mistake after 
selecting green clothes, but their intentions to clear up the error were lower when they previously 
chose conventional clothes (F(2, 87) = 11.21, p < .001; Mmoral = 5.10, Mcontrol = 3.97, Mimmoral = 
2.82; pmoral/control < .05, d = .60; pimmoral/control < .05, d = .65; Figure 3, Panel A). For target behavior 
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with greater moral ambiguity, participants with a stronger promotion focus indicated more 
willingness to point out the error if they previously had chosen conventional clothes, compared 
with the control group. If a promotion focus prevailed, their stated intentions to clear up the error 
decreased marginally after selecting green clothes, compared with the control condition (F(2, 89) 
= 10.90, p < .001; Mmoral = 2.64, Mcontrol = 3.70, Mimmoral = 4.93; pmoral/control = .06, d = .57; 
pimmoral/control < .05, d = .63; Figure 3, Panel A). If instead the moral ambiguity of the target 
behavior was lower, the prevention-repetition effect persists, but the differences across conditions 
diminish, compared with the findings in our previous studies (F(2, 89) = 8.22, p < .01; Mmoral = 
5.96, Mcontrol = 5.06, Mimmoral = 4.00; pmoral/control = .09, d = .54; pimmoral/control = .09, d = .56; Figure 
3, Panel B). In addition, for consumers with a strong promotion focus, the balancing effects do 
not occur. That is, the willingness to point out a service mistake after selecting green or 
conventional clothes does not differ from the control condition (F(2, 92) = .25, p > .05; Mmoral = 
5.23, Mcontrol = 5.18, Mimmoral = 4.90; Figure 3, Panel B). 
Discussion 
This study helps reconcile our findings with extant literature, especially the results provided 
by Zhang et al. (2014). Study 3 reveals that the promotion-balancing effect does not arise for 
target behaviors with low moral ambiguity, such as lying or cheating, as were studied by Zhang 
et al. Thus, it helps explain why prevalent psychology literature has not established a moral self-
regulation pattern for people with a strong promotion focus. Instead, the prevention-repetition 
effect arises for more morally ambiguous target behaviors. In psychology literature, immoral 
behavior is often described as blatant transgressions, such as lying, cheating or stealing 
(Cornelissen et al., 2013; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Zhang et al., 2014). But in consumption 
settings, ethicality or morality often is more subtle, such as purchasing green or recycled products 
(Brinkmann, 2004; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Susewind & Hoelzl, 2014). Consumption decisions, 
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and the dependent variables in our studies, offer more moral ambiguity than blatant behaviors 
such as lying. Therefore, the promotion-balancing and prevention-repetition effects have 
important implications for understanding morality in the marketplace. Study 4 provides more 
direct insights into the process by which a promotion or prevention focus exerts different effects 
on subsequent moral behaviors. 
Study 4: The mediating role of status quo maintenance and perceived goal progress 
Design and procedure 
In Study 4, we examine mediators of the prevention-repetition and promotion-balancing 
effects. We measure consumers’ regulatory focus and manipulate the morality of the first 
decision, thereby devising a one-factorial design with three experimental conditions (first 
decision: moral vs. immoral vs. control). The sample consisted of 260 students and university 
employees (52.7% male; Mage = 22.8 years, SDage = 3.35 years) of a major German university. 
Measures 
Dependent variable. In accordance with our dependent variable in Study 1 and morality 
definition (see “Moral consumption behavior and consumers’ moral self-regulation”), we use the 
intention to purchase eco-friendly versus conventional clothing as the dependent measure. 
Participants saw short product descriptions of two sweaters that differed only in that one sweater 
was made from recycled cotton and polyester, while the other featured conventional cotton and 
polyester. As in Study 1, the stated price of the eco-friendly sweater was one-third higher than 
that of the conventional sweater. Participants indicated their relative preference for the eco-
friendly sweater on a 7-point scale (1 = most likely to buy the sweater from conventional material 
and 7 = most likely to buy the sweater from recycled material).  
Regulatory focus. To assess consumers’ chronic regulatory focus, we used an 18-item 
scale (Lockwood et al., 2002), with 9 items to assess a chronic prevention (e.g., “In general, I am 
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focused on preventing negative events in my life”; CR = .81) and 9 items to measure a chronic 
promotion (e.g., “In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life”; CR = .78) 
goal orientation. Participants responded on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly 
agree). Following RFT (Higgins, 1997, 2002), we treat promotion and prevention focus as two 
separate dimensions. Thus, we averaged the ratings for both subscales and included them as two 
continuous measures in our analyses. 
Morality of the first decision. Following Khan and Dhar (2006), we manipulated the first 
decision by asking participants to imagine that they received a €500 tax refund. In the moral 
condition, participants were told that they decided to donate €100 of that money to charity. Then, 
we provided short descriptions of two charity organizations and asked the participants to choose 
which of the two organizations they would donate the money to. In the immoral condition, 
participants were told that they decided to donate the money to neither of the organizations but to 
keep it for themselves. In the control condition, participants chose between two boxes filled with 
10 neutral words each, to create a scenario with a morally neutral choice. The manipulation check 
was the same as the one used in Studies 2 and 3 (CR = .80). 
Mediators. We measured participants’ motivation to maintain the status quo created by the 
first decision with six items (e.g., “After my prior decision, I would rather stay with my decision 
than to try something new now”; CR = .87; adapted from Yang & Urminsky, 2015). For 
participants’ perceived progress toward the goal of acting morally, we included six items (e.g., 
“Due to my prior decision, I feel I’ve made progress toward my goal of acting morally”; CR = 
.80; adapted from Cheema & Bagchi, 2011; Salerno et al., 2015). 
Results 
Manipulation checks. A one-way ANOVA with the first decision’s morality as the 
independent variable and the manipulation check as the dependent variable confirmed the success 
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of the manipulation of the morality of the first decision. As expected, participants who were told 
that they had donated part of their tax refund rated their decision as more moral than participants 
in the control condition (F(2, 253) = 66.07, p < .001; Mmoral = 4.69, Mcontrol = 3.81, pmoral/control < 
.001). Not donating the money also appeared less moral, relative to the control (Mimmoral = 2.37, 
Mcontrol = 3.81, pimmoral/control < .001). 
Hypotheses testing. To examine H5, we conducted separate bootstrap dual mediation 
analyses (Hayes, 2013; model 4; 10,000 samples) for the moral, immoral, and control conditions; 
prevention focus was the independent variable, motivation to maintain the status quo and 
perceived goal progress were mediators, and the intention to purchase eco-friendly versus 
conventional clothing provided the dependent measure (see Table 3). Among participants who 
donated money (moral condition), the indirect effect of their prevention focus on willingness to 
purchase the eco-friendly product, through their motivation to maintain the status quo, was 
positive and significant (effect = .18; bias-corrected 95% confidence interval [CI] = [.05, .41]). 
Perceived goal progress did not mediate this relationship (effect = .04; bias-corrected 95% CI = [-
.09, .22]). For participants who kept the money for themselves (immoral condition), a stronger 
prevention focus also exerted an indirect effect on the target behavior, through motivation to 
maintain the status quo (effect = -.10; bias-corrected 95% CI = [-.30, -.007]). Perceived goal 
progress again did not mediate the relationship between prevention focus and the dependent 
variable (effect = -.09; bias-corrected 95% CI = [-.27, .01]). Thus, our results support H5.  
For H6, we conducted separate dual mediation analyses (Hayes, 2013; model 4; 10,000 
samples) for the moral, immoral, and control conditions, with promotion focus as the independent 
variable but the same mediators and dependent measure (Table 3). In the moral condition, 
promotion focus exerts a negative indirect effect on willingness to purchase the eco-friendly 
product, through perceived goal progress (effect = -.18; bias-corrected 95% CI = [-.44, -.04]). 
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Motivation to maintain the status quo does not mediate this relationship (effect = -.05; bias-
corrected 95% CI = [-.27, .12]). Perceived goal progress also fully mediates the relationship 
between a promotion focus and willingness to purchase the eco-friendly sweater in the immoral 
condition (effect = .29; bias-corrected 95% CI = [.04, .67]). Again, in the immoral condition, we 
find no significant indirect effect through motivation to maintain the status quo (effect = -.009; 
bias-corrected 95% CI = [-.18, .12]). The results confirm the process described in H6. 
Discussion 
This study provides support for the proposed process by which prevention-focused 
consumers repeat both prior moral and immoral behavior, due to their motivation to maintain the 
status quo. We thus empirically confirm the mediator proposed (but not tested) by Zhang et al. 
(2014). Yet promotion-focused consumer behavior is not influenced by a motivation to maintain 
the status quo but rather by perceived progress toward the goal of acting morally. After moral 
decisions, promotion-focused consumers perceive progress toward their morality goals, allowing 
for subsequent transgressions. In contrast, immoral consumption decisions hinder their goal 
progress, leading to compensatory consumption decisions subsequently.  
General discussion 
Consumers’ moral decisions in the marketplace do not take place in isolation; they are 
influenced by past moral decisions. Thus, it is important to understand consumers’ moral self-
regulation in sequential consumption situations. With four experimental studies, we explore when 
and why consumers repeat or balance their behavior and accordingly corroborate the prevention-
repetition effect, while also revealing a promotion-balancing effect. These results have important 
implications for consumer theory, especially for the study of consumers’ moral self-regulation, as 
well as potential real-world implications for companies. 
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Contributions to theory and practice 
Our results from four laboratory studies show that a consumer’s inherent or situationally 
induced regulatory focus influences whether he or she regulates or repeats moral consumption 
decisions, which suggests three main theoretical contributions. First, this research reveals that the 
prevention-repetition effect described in psychology studies (Zhang et al., 2014) exists in general 
consumption behavior, as well as in specific consumption contexts. We also demonstrate the 
robustness of the prevention-repetition effect, confirmed for both blatant and for more morally 
ambiguous behaviors. This extended discussion of the influence of regulatory focus on moral 
self-regulation patterns, to the domain of consumer behavior, thus contributes theoretically to a 
better understanding of repetitive behavior in the marketplace. We provide empirical support for 
the prediction that the prevention-repetition effect stems from prevention-focused consumers’ 
strong motivation to maintain the status quo created by their own prior decisions.  
Second, in consumption situations, promotion-focused consumers balance their moral and 
immoral behavior. Specifically, we show that balancing effects occur only among consumers 
with a strong promotion focus. We thus contribute to explaining the frequently reported small 
effect sizes of moral balancing (Blanken et al., 2015). Even within the group of promotion-
focused consumers though, moral balancing effects prevail only when the target behaviors are not 
clearly moral or immoral. Consumption decisions typically involve less clear-cut morality than 
the unequivocal moral decisions typically studied in psychology research, so our research 
contributes to an expanded understanding of the dynamics of consumers’ moral self-regulation. 
Third, we affirm that promotion-focused people balance their consumption decisions and 
show that perceived progress toward the goal of being a moral person is the motive that underlies 
the promotion-balancing effect. In so doing, we contribute to a better understanding of moral 
licensing and moral cleansing effects and the influence of promotion focus on these sequential 
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consumption behaviors. Overall, our findings contribute theoretically to a better understanding of 
morality in the marketplace. 
Furthermore, our findings have some interesting practical implications. Companies with 
substantial information about consumers’ past consumption decisions and preferences (e.g., 
online retailers) might benefit particularly from our insights. If companies want to induce self-
regulation, to sway consumers to consider more sustainable alternatives, they might use online 
product ads to induce a particular regulatory focus. Consumers’ regulatory focus can be affected 
by situational primes (e.g., Lee & Aaker, 2004). For shoppers who previously consumed moral 
products (e.g., recycled or cause-related products), a prevention focus will encourage them to 
make more moral consumption decisions thereafter. Targeting these customers with prevention-
related messages (e.g., highlighting how organic products protect the environment) may 
strengthen their preference for moral consumption decisions. If they previously consumed less 
moral options, the ads instead might aim to induce a promotion focus (e.g., promoting green 
products as a means to improve one’s own health), to evoke cleansing behavior (i.e., more moral 
consumption decisions) subsequently. 
Furthermore, companies could reduce licensing effects in consumption decisions by 
increasing the perceived clarity (i.e., lack of ambiguity) of the moral consumption situation. 
Following their prior moral consumption behaviors, a company might present shoppers with 
information or ads emphasizing the importance of consumption decisions for the welfare of 
others and the environment. The lower perceived ambiguity of the moral consumption decision 
would reduce promotion-focused consumers’ license for moral transgressions, while also 
allowing prevention-focused consumers to repeat their prior moral decisions. 
Charitable organizations also might find these results of benefit. Donors who have been 
generous in the past could be sent thank you cards telling them, for example, that through their 
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donations, they contributed to a moral cause such as preventing the transmission of a certain 
disease in a developing country. The resulting induced prevention focus should stimulate their 
repetitive moral behavior. People who have not donated in the past instead could be sent flyers 
stating that contributions are necessary to improve, for example, education in developing 
countries; the promotion focus thus induced should lead to more donations subsequently.  
Limitations and further research 
To gain a better understanding of the complex processes of moral self-regulation, we 
examined sequential moral consumption decisions; we do not shed any light on the erosion of 
moral licensing or cleansing mechanisms over time. The goal progress achieved through moral 
behavior and the license for subsequent immoral decisions both may diminish over time (Miller 
& Effron, 2010). Replications of our studies using longitudinal data would be an important next 
step to increase the generalizability of the findings. Additional studies showing that promotion-
focused consumers behave immorally in a situation that follows moral consumption, but not 
thereafter, also could strengthen our theoretical reasoning regarding the moral licensing effect.  
We analyzed the ambiguity of the target behavior as a contingency effect on the influence 
of a promotion focus on moral self-regulation. Other boundary conditions also might influence 
promotion-focused consumers’ moral balancing or prevention-focused consumers’ consistency 
patterns, such as the social observability of consumption. That is, licensing effects are more 
pronounced for public rather than private moral behavior (Kristofferson, White, & Peloza, 2014), 
such that private consumption might diminish the promotion-balancing effect, but a prevention-
repetition effect might persist even after private initial behavior, due to prevention-focused 
consumers’ motive to maintain the status quo. Studies of the boundary conditions of the 
prevention-repetition effect also could provide novel insights into how prevention-focused 
consumers might be prevented from repeating their prior immoral decisions. 
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We studied two cognitive mediators of the self-regulatory patterns in moral consumption 
behavior; further research might test emotions as mediators. Prevalent literature suggests that 
different emotions arise as a function of the prevailing regulatory focus (e.g., Higgins, Shah, & 
Friedman, 1997). Examining these mediators could further improve our understanding of the 
factors that underlie moral balancing and moral consistency.  
We studied different moral consumption contexts, such as purchases of organic food 
products, which might benefit not only the environment and others (e.g., farmers), but also the 
decision maker him- or herself (who benefits from healthier food). Further research might study 
moral decision making in other decision contexts, such as when the welfare of others does not 
concomitantly increase with the decision-maker’s welfare. 
Finally, for our four studies, we used experimental laboratory settings. Further studies with 
consequential choices and behaviors or field studies would help augment the external validity of 
our findings. We studied moral self-regulation in relation to individual consumption decisions, 
but consumers with different regulatory foci might not display the same moral self-regulation 
when making consumption decisions as part of a group (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008). This 
issue could be addressed with further experiments that take place in varied consumer decision-
making contexts.  
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Table 1  
Overview of experimental studies. 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Purpose Analysis of 
influence of 
regulatory focus 
on moral 
balancing and 
consistency 
 
Replication of 
influence of 
regulatory focus 
on moral 
balancing and 
consistency 
Study of the moral 
ambiguity of the 
target behavior as 
a boundary 
condition for the 
influence of 
promotion focus 
on moral 
balancing effect  
Study of the 
processes 
underlying the 
differing 
influence of 
promotion and 
prevention focus 
on sequential 
moral 
consumption 
decisions 
Experim
ental 
Design 
3 (first decision: 
moral vs. immoral 
vs. control)  2 
(regulatory focus: 
prevention vs. 
promotion) design 
 
3 (first decision: 
moral vs. immoral 
vs. control)  2 
(regulatory focus: 
prevention vs. 
promotion) design 
3 (first decision: 
moral vs. immoral 
vs. control)  2 
(moral ambiguity: 
high vs. low)  2 
(regulatory focus: 
prevention vs. 
promotion) design 
3 (first decision: 
moral vs. 
immoral vs. 
control) factorial 
design, regulatory 
focus and 
mediators 
measured 
Studied 
consump
tion 
behavior 
 First decision: 
recalled moral or 
immoral 
behavior 
 Second decision: 
relative 
preference for 
organic or 
conventional 
coffee 
 First decision: 
choice of green 
or conventional 
convenience 
goods  
 Second decision: 
choice to keep 
or donate reward 
in a customer 
referral program 
 First decision: 
choice of green 
or conventional 
clothes 
 Second decision: 
point out service 
mistake  
 First decision: 
donate to 
charity or keep 
money for 
oneself 
 Second 
decision: 
relative 
preference for 
sweater made 
from recycled 
or conventional 
materials 
Sample n = 182  
50.5% male 
Mean age = 26.54 
(SD = 10.61) 
n = 176  
39.80% male 
Mean age = 26.04 
(SD = 8.93) 
n = 369 
42% male 
Mean age = 22.98  
(SD = 3.37) 
n = 260 
52.7% male 
Mean age = 22.8  
(SD = 3.35) 
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Table 2  
Effect of regulatory focus and morality of the first decision on preference for donating 
the reward (Study 2). 
Independent Variable b 95% CI for Odds Ratio 
 (SE) LLCI Odds 
Ratio 
ULCI 
Regulatory focus (RF) -.25 
(.52) 
.27 .77 2.14 
Dummy 1 (moral vs. control) 1.20** 
(.61) 
. 99 3.32 11.05 
Dummy 2 (immoral vs. control) -1.33** 
(.55) 
.08 .26 .77 
RF  Dummy 1 -2.41*** 
(.83) 
.01 .08 .446 
RF  Dummy 2 2.61*** 
(.80) 
2.80 13.62 66.24 
Note: N = 176. Nagelkerke’s R² = .26. For regulatory focus, a value of 0 represents a prevention focus, 
and 1 represents a promotion focus. The morality of the first decision was dummy coded, such that 
Dummy 1 compares choosing green convenience goods in the first decision (value 1) with the control 
condition (value 0), and Dummy 2 compares donation preferences for participants who subsequently 
chose from conventional convenience goods (value 1) with participants in the control condition (value 0). 
CI = confidence interval, LLCI = lower level confidence interval, ULCI = upper level confidence interval, 
and SE = standard error. 
** Significant at p ≤ .05. 
***  Significant at p ≤ .01. 
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Table 3 
Dual mediation analyses (Study 4) for influence of regulatory focus on intention to purchase 
eco-friendly sweater (ECO) through motivation to maintain status quo (SQ) and perceived 
goal progress (GP). 
Regulatory Focus Effect (SE) t p BootLLCI 
 
BootULCI 
 
Prevention Focus     
Moral     
Prevention  ECO  .39 (.18) 2.07 .04 .01 .76 
Prevention  SQ  ECO  .18 (.08) − − .05 .41 
Prevention  GP  ECO  .04 (.07) − − -.09 .22 
Immoral      
Prevention  ECO -.52 (.18) -2.81 .00 -.90 -.15 
Prevention  SQ  ECO  -.10 (.07) − − -.30 -.007 
Prevention  GP  ECO  -.09 (.07) − − -.27 .01 
Control      
Prevention  ECO -.27 (.20) -1.32 .19 -.68 .13 
Prevention  SQ  ECO .00 (.06) − − -.11 .13 
Prevention  GP  ECO  -.01 (.04) − − -.15 .05 
Promotion Focus      
Moral     
Promotion  ECO  -.26 (.22) -1.19 .23 -.71 .17 
Promotion  SQ  ECO -.05 (.09) − − -.27 .12 
Promotion  GP  ECO  -.18 (.09) − − -.44 -.04 
Immoral      
Promotion  ECO  .13 (.25) .51 .60 -.38 .65 
Promotion  SQ  ECO -.009 (.07) − − -.18 .12 
Promotion  GP  ECO .29 (.15) − − .04 .67 
Control      
Promotion  ECO -.37 (.28) -1.31 .19 -.94 .19 
Promotion  SQ  ECO  -.005 (.03) − − -.12 .04 
Promotion  GP  ECO -.004 (.07) − − -.16 .14 
Notes: N = 260. The table reports unstandardized regression coefficients. SE = standard error, BootLLCI = 
lower-level bootstrap confidence interval, BootULCI = upper-level bootstrap confidence interval. The 95% 
confidence intervals were created using 10,000 bootstrap samples; confidence intervals that do not contain 0 
indicate significant effects. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Graphical representation of Study 1 results. 
Figure 2: Graphical representation of Study 2 results. 
Figure 3: Graphical representation of Study 3 results. 
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of Study 1 results.  
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of Study 2 results. 
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of Study 3 results. 
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